Catalysts as Prevailing Parties under the Equal Access to Justice Act by Miller, Macon Dandridge
Catalysts as Prevailing Parties under the
Equal Access to Justice Act
Macon Dandridge Millert
Many federal statutes provide for the recovery of reasonable at-
torney's fees by a "prevailing party."' Until recently, courts had inter-
preted prevailing party to include those who brought about a volun-
tary change in the defendant's conduct even though they did not ob-
tain judicially sanctioned relief. Recovery was allowed under this so-
called catalyst theory because the party had achieved its desired result
in the lawsuit.
2
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this definition of prevail-
ing party for the purposes of recovery under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 3 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 ("FHAA")4 in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc v West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources. The Court held
that a party that merely serves as a catalyst does not qualify as a pre-
vailing party under these statutes.6 By rejecting the definition of pre-
vailing party on which a majority of circuit courts had settled, the
Court severely limited a party's ability to recover attorney's fees.
The narrower definition of prevailing party embraced by the
Buckhannon Court has serious implications, particularly concerning
civil rights and the possibility of its extension to other federal statutes,
such as the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). This Comment ex-
t B.A. 1997,Vanderbilt University; J.D. Candidate 2003,7The University of Chicago.
I See, for example, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352,78 Stat 259, codified at 42
USC § 2000e-5(k) (1994); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-559,90
Stat 2641, codified at 42 USC § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp 2000); Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub L
No 96-481,94 Stat 2325 (1980), codified at 5 USC § 504,28 USC § 2412 (1994 & 1998 Supp); 66
Stat 813 (1952), codified at 35 USC § 285 (1994):
2 See, for example, Stanton v Southern Berkshire Regional School District, 197 F3d 574,
577 (lst Cir 1999) (interpreting prevailing party to include catalysts); Marbley v Bane, 57 F3d
224,234 (2d Cir 1995) (recognizing the catalyst theory as a viable form of recovery as a prevail-
ing party); Baumgartner v Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F3d 541,551 (3d Cir 1994) (holding
that "there is no legal impediment to application of the 'catalyst theory' to show that plaintiffs
were 'prevailing parties' notwithstanding the absence of a judgment or consent decree"); Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund Inc v EPA, 716 F2d 915,919 (DC Cir 1983) (holding that a party can
achieve prevailing party status without having received a final judgment in its favor).
3 Pub L No 101-336,104 Stat 327, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq (1994).
4 Pub L No 100-430,102 Stat 1619, codified at 42 USC § 3601 et seq (1994).
5 532 US 598 (2001).
6 Id at 610.
7 Pub L 96-481,94 Stat 2325 (1980), codified at 5 USC § 504,28 USC § 2412 (1994 & Supp
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amines whether the holding of Buckhannon applies to the EAJA.
While the Supreme Court clearly disapproved of the catalyst theory
for the statutes at issue in Buckhannon, it did not specifically discuss
the applicability of its decision to the EAJA. Lower courts addressing
Buckhannon's application to the EAJA have reached different con-
clusions.8 Upon analysis of the relevant considerations, this Comment
ultimately determines that the catalyst theory continues to be a valid
means of achieving prevailing party status under the EAJA.
Part I begins by introducing fee-shifting statutes and outlining the
specific fee-shifting provisions of the EAJA. This Part continues with a
discussion of pre-Buckhannon recovery of attorney's fees by prevail-
ing parties and then presents the Buckhannon decision-both the
majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg's dissent. Part II examines
current law on the question of Buckhannon's applicability to the
EAJA. Of the relatively few courts that have addressed the issue, most
have applied Buckhannon's narrower definition of prevailing party to
the EAJA; however, one court has distinguished Buckhannon, holding
it inapplicable to the EAJA. Part III argues that the Supreme Court's
rejection of the catalyst theory in Buckhannon should not extend to
the EAJA and that a broader definition of prevailing party is appro-
priate for that statute. Textually, Buckhannon limits its applicability to
the ADA and FHAA. Even more importantly, those statutes are dis-
tinguishable from the EAJA (in language, stated rationale, and inte-
gral components) such that Buckhannon simply is not applicable. The
legislative purpose and history of the EAJA further separate it from
the statutes at issue in Buckhannon; these demonstrate that Buckhan-
non's definition of prevailing party is inconsistent with the EAJA and
that, rather, a definition of prevailing party including the catalyst the-
ory was intended by Congress. Moreover, various policy considera-
tions counsel against application of Buckhannon to the EAJA. There-
fore, this Comment concludes that the EAJA is not and should not be
bound by Buckhannon's interpretation of prevailing party.
1998). The EAJA provides for awards of attorney's fees to parties prevailing against the United
States in certain judicial and agency proceedings.
8 Compare Perez-Arellano v Smith, 279 F3d 791 (9th Cir 2002) (extending Buckhannon);
Alcocer v INS, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 20543, *5-8 (N D Tex 2001) (same); Thayer v Principi, 15
Vet App 204 (2001) (same), with Brickwood Contractors; Inc v United States, 49 Fed C1 738,749-
50 (2001) (distinguishing Buckhannon).
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I. FEE SHIrING AND THE EAJA
A. Background
Litigants in the United States traditionally must bear their own
attorney's fees, regardless of whether they win or lose.9 Judicially fash-
ioned exceptions to this "American Rule" have evolved at common
law, but these exceptions are narrow.' In addition, however, Congress
has created statutory exceptions to the American Rule that allow re-
covery of attorney's fees under certain circumstances. Numerous fed-
eral statutes include fee-shifting provisions making fees awardable to
prevailing parties."
Exceptions to the American Rule are not as tightly confined as
they once were, and fee shifting has increasingly been used to encour-
age litigation that is considered beneficial to society.2 One of the most
significant and often-cited reasons for limiting the American Rule has
been to enable private enforcement of public policy.'3 Fee shifting
promotes suits by citizens and, thus, helps them act as "private attor-
neys general.' '
In keeping with this congressional policy of encouraging private
enforcement of public policy, some courts in the 1960s and 1970s per-
mitted fee shifting where the litigant was promoting the public inter-
9 See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co v Wilderness Society, 421 US 240,247 (1975) ("In the
United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorney's
fee from the loser."). This contrasts with other judicial systems, such as that of England, in which
the prevailing party recovers from the loser. See id (stating that in England "counsel fees are
regularly allowed to the prevailing party"). The practice of the American system was recognized
as early as 1796. Id at 249. See also Arcambel v Wiseman, 3 US (3 Dall) 306,306 (1796) (stating
that the general practice in America is against inclusion of attorney's fees as damages). For a de-
tailed discussion of the American rule, see John Leubsdorf Toward a History of the American
Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 L & Contemp Probs 9 (1984).
10 See Charles R. Haywood, Comment, The Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Shift Fees Un-
der the Equal Access to Justice Act, 61 U Chi L Rev 985, 987 (1994) ("Common law exceptions,
however, have narrow applicability and are geared toward redressing specific injustices after liti-
gation.'). See also Claire Elizabeth 'mold, Comment, Institutionalizing an Experiment: The Ex-
tension of the Equal Access to Justice Act-Questions Resolved, Questions Remaining, 14 Fla St U
L Rev 925,925-26 (1987) (providing examples of judge-made exceptions).
11 See Marek v Chesny, 473 US 1, 43-51 (1985) (Brennan dissenting) (appendix) (listing
federal fee-shifting statutes).
12 Haywood, Comment, 61 U Chi L Rev at 988 (cited in note 10) (describing modem use
of fee-shifting). See also Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries Introducing
the Problem, 1986 Duke L J 435,446 (considering public benefit as one possible justification for
fee-shifting).
13 See Haywood, Comment, 61 U Chi L Rev at 988 (cited in note 10) (discussing private
enforcement of public policy as a fee-shifting rationale); Wiold, Comment, 14 Fla St U L Rev at
926-27 (cited in note 10) (same). See also John J. Sullivan, Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act
in the Federal Courts, 84 Colum L Rev 1089, 1090-92 (1984) (discussing the "erosion of the
American Rule" and the events leading up to the enactment of the EAJA).
14 Haywood, Comment, 611U Chi L Rev at 988 (cited in note 10) (discussing the private at-
torney general rationale).
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est, even in the absence of specific statutory fee-shifting authority." In
1975, the Supreme Court disapproved of this judicial expansion of the
private attorney general concept, re-emphasized the American Rule,
and forbade fee shifting absent specific statutory or common law au-
thority.'6 Congress immediately responded by expanding statutory fee-
shifting authority in order to preserve the private enforcement of pub-
lic policy." Beginning with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 8 it proceeded to pass statutes that provided for fee shift-
ing for the public benefit.'9 Congressional action culminated in the
passage of the EAJA in 1980, which marked an unprecedented move
to expand the statutory exceptions to the American Rule.2
B. The EAJA
The EAJA has two major components. First, the statute includes
a waiver of sovereign immunity, so that the government is subject to
fee shifting like any private litigant.2' Second, and more importantly,
the EAJA contains a fee-shifting provision for the recovery of fees by
a prevailing party-plaintiff or defendant-in a nontort civil action
against the United States.n The prevailing party is entitled to recover
unless the position of the United States was "substantially justified" or
15 See id at 988-89 (discussing courts' allowance of fee-shifting in this context); see also
Winold, Comment, 14 Fla St U L Rev at 927 (cited in note 10) (same); Sullivan, Note, 84 Colum
L Rev at 1091 (cited in note 13) (same).
16 Alyeska, 421 US at 263 ("[C]ongressional utilization of the private-attorney-general
concept can in no sense be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the tradi-
tional rule ... and to award attorneys' fees whenever the courts deem the public policy furthered
by a particular statute important enough to warrant the award.").
17 Haywood, Comment, 61 U Chi L Rev at 989 (cited in note 10) (discussing Congress's re-
action to Alyeska).
18 Pub L No 94-559,90 Stat 2641, codified at 42 USC § 1988(b) (1994).
19 Haywood, Comment, 61 U Chi L Rev at 989 (cited in note 10) (discussing Congress's
enactment of fee-shifting statutes after Alyeska).
20 See id at 990 (discussing the EAJA's enactment); Winold, Comment, 14 Fla St U L Rev
at 929 (cited in note 10) (same).
21 See 28 USC § 2412(b) ("The United States shall be liable for [] fees and expenses to the
same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of
any statute which specifically provides for such an award."). Therefore, the federal government
no longer is exempt from the common law fee-shifting provisions. See Haywood, Comment, 61 U
Chi L Rev at 990 (cited in note 10) (discussing the EAJA's waiver of sovereign immunity); Vi-
nold, Comment, 14 Fla St U L Rev at 929-30 (cited in note 10) (same).
22 See 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(A):
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other ex-
penses,.., incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) ...
brought by or against the United States .... unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award un-
just.
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unless an award would be unjust." The EAJA provides for fee shifting
in administrative adjudications as well.24
In general, the EAJA mandates fee awards against the United
States to private litigants in certain situations. 2 The statute's stated
purpose is "to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or
defending against, governmental action"2 and to ensure that common
law and statutory exceptions to the American Rule apply in actions
involving the United States. Recognizing not only the expense of
vindicating one's rights in litigation but the greater resources and ex-
pertise of the government, Congress attempted to place private citi-
zens and businesses on more equal footing with the United States.2
C. Prevailing Party in Fee-shifting Statutes Prior to Buckhannon
Prior to Buckhannon, "prevailing party" was construed in a flexi-
ble fashion and the use of the catalyst theory to determine whether a
party seeking attorney's fees had prevailed was well established. Un-
der the catalyst theory, if a party brings about a voluntary change in
the defendant's conduct, it qualifies as a prevailing party and can re-
cover attorney's fees. The existence of a formal victory is not a re-
23 Id. The EAJA represents a form of one-way fee-shifting: the government may be held li-
able for attorney's fees but may not assert the liability of others. See Dobbs, 1986 Duke L J at
448-49 (cited in note 12) (discussing one-way fee shifting and mentioning the EAJA). Thus, the
EAJA makes a distinction between government and citizen rather than the more typical plain-
tiff/defendant distinction, which is found in many statutes authorizing fee awards only to prevail-
ing plaintiffs. Id.
24 See 5 USC § 504(a)(1) ("An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award,
to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party
in connection with that proceeding, unless ... the position of the agency was substantially justi-
fied or that special circumstances make an award unjust.").
25 See EAJA, 94 Stat 2325.
26 Id at §202(e)(1).
27 Id at § 202(c)(2).
28 See id at § 202(a) ("The Congress finds that certain individuals, partnerships, corpora-
tions, and labor and other organizations may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending
against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vin-
dication of their rights in civil actions and in administrative proceedings."). See also id at §
202(b) ("The Congress further finds that because of the greater resources and expertise of the
United States the standard for an award of fees against the United States should be different
from the standard governing an award against a private litigant, in certain situations."); Equal
Access to Justice Act, IR Rep No 96-1418,96th Cong, 2d Sess 1, 9 (1980) ("strong movement by
Congress toward placing the Federal Government and civil litigants on a completely equal foot-
ing").
29 See Marbley v Bane, 57 F3d 224,233-34 (2d Cir 1995) (recognizing the catalyst theory as
a viable form of recovery as a prevailing party). See also Hewitt v Helms, 482 US 755, 760-61
(1987) (declaring that when a lawsuit produces voluntary action by the defendant that affords
the plaintiff all or some of the relief he sought through a judgment, the plaintiff is deemed to
have prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in his favor). While Hewitt discusses the
catalyst theory and seems to indicate its viability, that issue was not decided by the Court, and
the language relating thereto is, therefore, dicta. See Buckhannon, 532 US at 603 n 5 (discussing
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quirement for prevailing-party status,' and an award may be justified
where a plaintiff can show that the lawsuit "accomplished the original
•, , 3 1
objectives of the lawsuit without a formal judgment.
Although the Supreme Court never had specifically ruled on
whether catalysts qualified as prevailing parties, an overwhelming ma-
jority of the federal courts of appeals recognized the theory's viabil-
ity.3 Only the Fourth Circuit has held the catalyst theory invalid,33 bas-
ing its decision on statements made by the Supreme Court in Farrar v
Hobby,' a case involving attorney's fees. The Farrar Court determined
that a plaintiff who receives nominal damages is a prevailing party."
Farrar "involved no catalytic effect," however, so the language on
which the Fourth Circuit relied was dicta." Following the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision, nine courts of appeals reaffirmed that prevailing-party
status may be achieved when the suit acts as a catalyst for the change
that was sought, even in the absence of an enforceable judgment, con-
sent decree, or settlement.3
Hewitt).
30 See Stanton v Southern Berkshire Regional School District, 197 F3d 574, 577 (1st Cir
1999) ("[A] plaintiff may ... deserve attorney's fees, even without a formal victory.").
31 Baumgartner v Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F3d 541, 551 (3d Cir 1994) (holding
that "there is no legal impediment to application of the 'catalyst theory' to show that plaintiffs
were 'prevailing parties' notwithstanding the absence of a judgment or consent decree").
32 See, for example, Nadeau v Helgemoe, 581 F2d 275,279-81 (1st Cir 1978) (approving of
recovery as a catalyst under 42 USC § 1988); Gerena-Valentin v Koch, 739 F2d 755, 758-59 (2d
Cir 1984) (Voting Rights Act of 1965); Institutionalized Juveniles v Secretary of Public Welfare;
758 F2d 897, 910-17 (3d Cir 1985) (Section 1988); Bonnes v Long, 599 F2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir
1979) (same); Robinson v Kimbrough, 652 F2d 458, 465-67 (5th Cir 1981) (same); Citizens
Against Tax Waste v Westerville City School District Board of Education, 985 F2d 255,257-58 (6th
Cir 1993) (same); Hendricks v Bowen, 847 F2d 1255, 1258 (7th Cir 1988) (EAJA); Williams v
Miller, 620 F2d 199, 202 (8th Cir 1980) (Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 and Section 1988);
American Constitutional Party v Munro, 650 F2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir 1981) (Section 1988);J & J
Anderson, Inc v Town of Erie, 767 F2d 1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir 1985) (same); Doe v Busbee; 684
F2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir 1982) (same); Grano v Barry, 783 F2d 1104, 1108-10 (DC Cir 1986)
(same).
33 See S-1 and S-2 v State Board of Education of North Carolina, 21 F3d 49, 51 (4th Cir
1994) (en banc) ("A person may not be a 'prevailing party' plaintiff.., except by virtue of having
obtained an enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement."), citing Farrar v Hobby, 506
US 103,111 (1992).
34 506 US 103, 112-16 (1992) (denying recovery of attorney's fees under Section 1988 to a
plaintiff who was a prevailing party but who had recovered nominal damages of only one dollar
on a claim for seventeen million dollars in compensatory damages).
35 Id at 112 ("We therefore hold that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing
party.").
36 Friends of Earth, Inc v Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc, 528 US 167, 194-95
(2000) (commenting that the catalyst theory was not at issue in Farrar but refraining from ad-
dressing the continued viability of the catalyst theory).
37 See Buckhannon, 532 US at 627 & n 5 (Ginsburg dissenting), citing Stanton, 197 F3d at
577 n 2 (recognizing the viability of the catalyst theory under 42 USC § 1988); Morris v West
Palm Beach, 194 F3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir 1999) (same); Payne v Board of Education, 88 F3d 392,
397 (6th Cir 1996) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Marbley, 57 F3d at 234 (Section
1988); Kilgour v Pasadena, 53 F3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir 1995) (same); Beard v Teska, 31 F3d 942,
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D. The Buckhannon Decision
In Buckhannon,s a 5-4 Supreme Court announced a more restric-
tive concept of prevailing party under the ADA and FHAA that de-
finitively excluded the catalyst theory as a permissible basis for an
award of attorney's fees under those statutes. The Buckhannon Court
held that to be eligible as a prevailing party, a party must secure a
judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, rather than
merely achieving the desired result in the lawsuit by bringing about a
voluntary change in the defendant's conduct39 While the Court recog-
nized that most courts of appeals allowed catalysts to collect as pre-
vailing parties,4i it nonetheless embraced the opposite view."
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist turned to
Black's Law Dictionary for a definition of prevailing party as "[a]
party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount
of damages awarded."42 Distilling from prior cases this idea that a pre-
vailing party is one that has been granted some judicial relief,
Rehnquist concluded that enforceable judgments on the merits and
court-ordered consent decrees create the "material alteration of the
legal relationship of the parties" necessary to permit an award of at-
torney's fees.4' The catalyst theory, on the other hand, would allow an
award where there was no judicially sanctioned change in the legal re-
lationship of the parties; therefore, it was impermissible.4 A voluntary
951-52 (10th Cir 1994) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Zinn v Shalala, 35 F3d 273,
276 (7th Cir 1994) (Section 1988); Baumgartner, 21 F3d at 546-50 (same); Little Rock School Dis-
trict v Pulaski County School District, No 1,17 F3d 260,263 n 2 (8th Cir 1994) (same).
38 Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc, a provider of assisted living, failed a state fire
inspection. 532 US at 600. Upon receiving orders to close, Buckhannon sued the State of West
Virginia, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief that the requirement they had failed to
meet violated the FHAA and ADA. Id at 600-01. When the West Virginia legislature mooted the
case byb eliminating the requirement, the suit was dismissed. Id at 601. Invoking the catalyst the-
ory, Buckhannon filed for attorney's fees as the prevailing party under the FHAA and ADA. Id.
39 Id at 603-06.
40 Id at 601-02.
41 Id at 605.
42 Id at 603. Chief Justice Rehnquist did so after mentioning that the statutes at issue pro-
vide an exception to the American Rule and are among a number of statutes in which Congress
has authorized the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Id. He listed as examples the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,78 Stat 259, the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 89 Stat 402,
and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,90 Stat 2641, and cited Marek v Chesny,
473 US 1, 43-51 (1985) (Brennan dissenting) (appendix) (listing federal fee-shifting statutes).
Buckhannon, 532 US at 602-03. Rehnquist noted that he would interpret the "nearly identical"
provisions at issue consistently, as that had been the practice with these fee-shifting provisions,
and cited Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424, 433 n 7 (1983) (noting that the standards set forth
with regard to § 1988 are generally applicable to fee-shifting statutes authorizing fee awards to
prevailing parties). Buckhannon, 532 US at 603 n 4.
43 Id at 603-04.
44 Id at 605. Rehnquist emphasized the danger inherent in even a limited form of the cata-
lyst theory: a complaint that had sufficient merit to withstand a motion to dismiss for lack of ju-
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change in the defendant's conduct may produce what the plaintiff
sought to achieve, but it "lack[s] the necessary judicial imprimatur on
the change."
The Buckhannon Court found arguments for adoption of a
broader definition of prevailing party unpersuasive. The majority dis-
counted the view that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act compels a reading of prevailing party that en-
compasses the catalyst theory.4' The Court believed the cited materials
were "at best ambiguous as to the availability of the 'catalyst theory'
and would not suffice to change the accepted meaning of prevailing
party, especially in light of the "explicit statutory authority" required
for an exception to the American Rule.8 The Buckhannon Court also
was unconcerned that rejection of the catalyst theory might deter
plaintiffs with "meritorious but expensive" cases from bringing suit.
9
In addition, the Court dismissed the idea that the catalyst theory was
necessary to prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting an action
before judgment in order to avoid paying attorney's fees.n On the
other hand, it was troubled by the potential disincentive that the cata-
lyst theory might create for a defendant to change its conduct volun-
tarily.5' Finally, the Court was hesitant to adopt an interpretation of the
fee-shifting statutes that would "spawn[ ] a second litigation of signifi-
cant dimension," which might occur if courts were required to deter-
mine if a party indeed had acted as a catalyst.5 2 The majority did not
deem it necessary to examine these policy issues, however, because it
purportedly rested its decision on the clear meaning of prevailing
party.'3
risdiction or failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted could allow a plaintiff to re-
cover attorney's fees. Id.
45 Id. The majority indicated its concern that inclusion of the catalyst theory would "abro-
gate the 'merit' requirement" and allow fee-shifting where the claim was "at least colorable" and
non-frivolous. Id at 606.
46 90 Stat 2641.
47 Buckhannon, 532 US at 607. The Court addressed this argument, however, because it
had relied on such legislative history in earlier cases. Id.
48 Id at 607-08. The legislative history consisted of a House Report stating that prevailing
party is "not intended to be limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment following a
full trial on the merits," a Senate Report explaining that "parties may be considered to have pre-
vailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining re-
lief," and a reference to a case decided six years before the Act in which a plaintiff, who had ob-
tained an enforceable judgment, was awarded attorney's fees as a prevailing party. Id at 607-08
&n9.
49 Id at 608.
50 Id at 608-09.
51 Id.
52 Id at 609. The Court was concerned with the difficulties involved in making the neces-
sary factual determinations, particularly in judging the defendant's subjective motivations in vol-
untarily changing its conduct. Id at 609-10.
53 Id at 610.
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Criticizing the majority's definition of prevailing party as uncom-
pelled by history, precedent, or the plain meaning of the relevant stat-
utes, Justice Ginsburg dissented." She took issue with the fact that the
rule adopted by the majority pivots on a technicality-the filing of a
court document-rather than resting on the actual merits of the case.55
Furthermore, she highlighted the negative impact that the narrower
definition would have on civil rights litigation.' More specifically, the
Court's rejection of the catalyst theory "impede[s] access to court for
the less well-heeled, and shrink[s] the incentive Congress created for
the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys general.' 'n Ac-
cording to Justice Ginsburg, "the 'catalyst rule,' as applied by the clear
majority of Federal Circuits, is a key component of the fee-shifting
statutes Congress adopted to advance enforcement of civil rights."'
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg found fault with the majority on the
following grounds. First, she noted that the dictionary definition em-
ployed by the majority was not inconsistent with a reading of prevail-
ing party that encompasses the catalyst theory, and in prior cases,
statutory terms of art have been given a contextual reading by the
Court." Additionally, the prevailing party language in the fee-shifting
provisions at issue stands in contrast to provisions of other statutes
that foreclose a catalyst theory. Justice Ginsburg also garnered sup-
port for the viability of the catalyst theory from the ordinary and
common meaning of prevailing party, as illustrated by Webster's Dic-
tionary.6' According to this meaning, a party in a lawsuit prevails when
it achieves the actual relief sought; a judgment is the means of attain-
ing that goal, not the end. 2
Justice Ginsburg also argued that the catalyst theory appropri-
ately advances Congress's objective in the modern fee-shifting statutes
of extending "civil rights protections and enforcement measures.
' '
6
Moreover, she found that the catalyst theory seems to have been
54 Id at 622-44. This case also includes a concurrence by Justice Scalia, in which he agreed
with the majority's opinion but responded in more detail to the contentions of the dissent. Id at
610-22 (Scalia concurring).
55 Id at 622-23 (Ginsburg dissenting). Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the required
"court entry memorializing [a] victory" need not be a judgment on the merits and does not re-
quire any finding of wrongdoing, since a court-approved settlement would suffice. Id at 622.
Conversely, a defendant who was driven by the merits of the case to grant the plaintiff's desired
relief may escape unscathed. Id.
56 Id at 623.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id at 628-29.
60 Id at 629-30.
61 Id at 633-34.
62 Id at 634, citing Hewitt v Helms, 482 US 755, 761 (1987) (describing the judicial decree as
the means not the end and stating that the goal is the defendant's change in conduct).
63 Buckhannon, 532 US at 635.
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within the definition of prevailing party envisioned by Congress." She
then addressed the policy issues hinted at by the majority, countering
the concerns related to inclusion of the catalyst theory."
Lastly, the dissent explained that when deciding the viability of
the catalyst theory, reliance on the practical impact of the lawsuit (and
not any "judicial imprimatur") would be most consistent with the
Court's attorney fee precedents." Justice Ginsburg further declared
that if the term "prevailing party" in fee-shifting statutes has an "ac-
cepted meaning," then it is the one "accepted by every Court of Ap-
peals to address the catalyst issue before our 1987 decision in Hewitt
and disavowed since then only by the Fourth Circuit."67
II. CURRENT LAW: BUCKHANNON'S APPLICABILITY TO THE EAJA
The applicability of Buckhannon to other federal statutes like the
EAJA that contain fee-shifting provisions for prevailing parties is un-
clear. Courts disagree as to whether Buckhannon's rejection of the
catalyst theory compels'a finding that the catalyst theory is no longer
available to achieve prevailing-party status under the EAJA.
A. The Majority Position: Buckhannon's Definition of "Prevailing
Party" Applies to the EAJA
Several courts have extended Buckhannon's rejection of the cata-
lyst theory to the EAJA,63 basing their decisions in large part upon the
note in Buckhannon that fee-shifting provisions have been interpreted
consistently.69 In Sileikis v Perryman,70 one district court held that in
light of Buckhannon, the catalyst theory is no longer available under
64 Id at 637-38. Unlike the majority, the dissent, in accordance with the longstanding view
of the courts of appeals, judged the House and Senate Reports mentioned above, see notes 46-48
and accompanying text, to be "hardly ambiguous." Id at 638.
65 Id at 638-40. The dissent pointed out that contrary to the view that defendants would re-
sist changing their behavior to keep payment of attorney's fees at bay, one might find that the
catalyst theory would bring about prompt compliance with the law, because prolonged litigation
is expensive. Id at 639. In fact, the expense of noncompliance may encourage compliance before
litigation. Id. The dissent also explained that rather than becoming a burden on the courts, the
catalyst theory actually may save judicial resources by encouraging the cessation of litigation af-
ter the relief sought has been granted by the defendant. Id at 639-40.
66 Id at 641 ("It bears emphasis, however that in determining whether shifting is in order,
the court in the past has placed greatest weight not on any 'judicial imprimatur,' but on the prac-
tical impact of the lawsuit.").
67 Id at 643 (internal citations omitted).
68 Just prior to publication, the Ninth Circuit handed down a decision extending Buckhan-
non's definition of "prevailing party" to the EAJA. See Perez-Arellano v Smith, 279 F3d 791,794
(9th Cir 2002) ("[Wle discern no reason to interpret the EAJA inconsistently with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of 'prevailing party' in the FHAA and the ADA as explained in Buckhan-
non.").
69 See note 42.
70 2001 US Dist LEXIS 12737 (N D Ill).
[69:13471356
Catalysts as Prevailing Parties under EAJA
the EAJA.7' The court discussed Buckhannon's observation that the
Supreme Court had always interpreted fee-shifting provisions consis-
tently and the fact that Buckhannon cited to the list of fee-shifting
statutes found in Marek v Chesny," which includes the EAJA.7 In ad-
dition, the court shared Buckhannon's concern that the catalyst theory
might deter the defendant from voluntarily altering its conduct and
would require the court's analysis of the defendant's subjective moti-
vations. Accordingly, the Sileikis court rejected the catalyst theory
under the EAJA.5
In Alcocer v INS,76 another district court denied prevailing-party
status to plaintiffs seeking it under the catalyst theory; but the court
did not explicitly pronounce the catalyst theory unavailable under the
EAJA in light of Buckhannon. The court stated that "although the
United States Supreme Court did not mention attorney's fees under
the EAJA in Buckhannon, it strongly insisted a court respect ordinary
language in its interpretation of the term 'prevailing party."'$ In a
note, the court mentioned Buckhannon's statement regarding the nu-
merous fee-shifting statutes and its note about their consistent inter-
pretation; yet, the court cited a recent federal claims case7 that created
an exception for the definition of prevailing party under the EAJA.80
It also discussed a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case 8 that, on the ba-
sis of Buckhannon, rejected reliance on the catalyst theory to achieve
prevailing-party status with respect to fee-shifting statutes and refused
an award under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act.2
71 See id at *8-9 (holding the catalyst theory unavailable under the EAJA for a plaintiff
whose requested relief was granted by the defendant without the court's intervention).
72 473 US 1, 43-51 (1985) (Brennan dissenting) (appendix to the dissent containing a list
of federal fee-shifting statutes).
73 Sileikis, 2001 US Dist Lexis 12737 at *5-6. The court also mentioned several recent
cases, not involving the EAJA, which discussed or applied the rule in Buckhannon. Id at *6-8.
74 Id at *8-9.
75 Id.
76 2001 US Dist LEXIS 20543 (N D Tex).
77 Id at *6-9. In Alcocer, plaintiffs filed for adjusted status and the INS subsequently inter-
viewed them, determining that the marriage might be fraudulent and an investigation must be
conducted. Id at *2. Two years later, plaintiffs filed the complaint at issue, seeking adjudication.
Id. Shortly after the US attorney was served with the complaint, the INS granted adjusted status
to the plaintiffs, mooting the subject matter of the suit. Id at *2-3. Plaintiffs sought attorney's
fees. Id at *3.
78 Id at *S. Note that Justice Ginsburg reached the opposite conclusion on the basis of or-
dinary language. See text accompanying notes 61-62.
79 Brickwood Contractors, Inc v United States, 49 Fed Cl 738 (2001) (distinguishing Buck-
hannon). See Part II.B.
so Alcocer,2001 US Dist LEXIS 20543 at *8 n 5.
81 Johnson v Rodriguez, 260 F3d 493,495 (5th Cir 2001) ("The Supreme Court has since re-
jected reliance on the 'catalyst theory' as a basis for awarding attorney's fees under fee-shifting
statutes authorizing awards to the 'prevailing party."').
82 Alcocer,2001 US Dist LEXIS 20543 at *8 n 5.
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Alcocer examined Buckhannon's examples of what judicial out-
comes are permissible for prevailing-party status (an enforceable
judgment on the merits or settlement agreement enforceable through
a court-ordered consent decree).3 The court then explained that it had
not considered the merits of the plaintiffs' claims nor granted any re-
lief in the lawsuit that changed the legal relationship between the par-
ties.4 The relief sought by the plaintiffs was granted extraneously, but
they "did not prevail in the lawsuit in any plausible sense of the
word."8 As a result, the court denied attorney's fees.
In Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Products v United
States,V the United States Court of International Trade ("CIT") ap-
plied Buckhannon by requiring a judicially sanctioned change in par-
ties' legal relationship for qualification as a prevailing party, even
when the plaintiff's legal action served as a catalyst for positive re-
sults." According to the court, Buckhannon did not limit its applicabil-
ity to the ADA, FHAA, and other statutes specifically listed in the
opinion, because it based its interpretation of prevailing party on stat-
utes other than those at issue in the case. 8 The CIT, like the district
courts, relied on Buckhannon's reference to the numerous fee-shifting
statutes authorizing an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party
and Buckhannon's statement that it has interpreted those statutes
consistently." Because the court did not award the plaintiffs relief
through an enforceable judgment on the merits or a court-ordered
consent decree, they were not prevailing parties.9'
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also has held that the
catalyst theory no longer is available to attain prevailing-party status
under the EAJA." In Thayer v Principi," it stated that "the language
of [the EAJA] as compared to the FHAA and ADA, coupled with the
83 Id at *8.
84 Id.
85 Id, citing Hewitt v Helms, 428 US 755,760 (1987) (stating that to prevail, a party must re-
ceive at least some relief on the merits of the claim).
86 Alcocer, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 20543 at *9.
87 176 F Supp 2d 1370 (Ct Intl Trade 2001).
88 Id at 1372-74.
89 Id at 1373.
90 Id.
91 Id. The court recognized the decision in Brickwood Contractors, Inc v United States, 49
Fed Cl 738 (2001), but found that even though the EAJA requires a decision on the merits of the
case, such a decision is not required for a determination of prevailing-party status. Id at 1373 n 3.
The court was "guided by" Buckhannon, because the EAJA contains the same prevailing party
requirement as the statutes listed in Buckhannon. Id.
92 See, for example, Thayer v Principi, 15 Vet App 204,211 (2001) ("the catalyst theory is
no longer available to achieve prevailing-party status in this Court"); Parsons v Principi, 2002 US
App Vet Claims LEXIS 12 (following Thayer); Dollar v Principi, 2001 US App Vet Claims
LEXIS 1516 (same).
93 15 Vet App 204,211 (2001).
1358 [69:1347
Catalysts as Prevailing Parties under EAJA
structure and content of the Supreme Court's opinion in Buckhannon,
demonstrates that the definition of 'prevailing party' set forth by the
Supreme Court in Buckhannon applies to" the EAJA ' First, the court
concluded that the fee-shifting provisions of EAJA are more similar
than not to those of the ADA and the FHAA and should, therefore,
be interpreted consistently.9' Second, the court was not convinced that
a different definition of prevailing party was warranted due to the
EAJA's "substantially justified" requirement.6 The court found that
the definition of prevailing party was not directly affected by the exis-
tence of that requirement.9' The court pointed to Buckhannon's men-
tion of the numerous fee-shifting statutes, its note about consistent in-
terpretation, and its cite to the Marek appendix" as indications that
the statutes should be interpreted consistently.9 Also, Buckhannon's
reference to many of the same opinions relied upon by the court in
developing its case law on the EAJA and the catalyst theory suggests
Buckhannon's relevance to the EAJA.' Finally, the court shared the
Supreme Court's concern with the difficulty of determining a defen-
dant's subjective motivation in changing its conduct if the catalyst
theory were applied. '°'
B. Brickwood: Buckhannon's Definition of Prevailing Party Does
Not Apply to the EAJA
In Brickwood Contractors, Inc v United States,9' the Court of Fed-
eral Claims held that Buckhannon's exclusion of the catalyst theory is
not binding on the EAJA. ' The court distinguished Buckhannon from
94 Id at 211. In Thayer, while the veteran was in the process of appealing the denial of his
claim for service connection for schizophrenia, he was awarded such a service connection and
the appeal was mooted. Id at 205. He filed for attorney's fees under the EAJA. Id.
95 Id at 208.
96 Id at 209. See 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(A) ("[A] court shall award to a prevailing party ...
unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.").
97 Thayer, 15 Vet App at 209.
93 See note 42.
99 Id at 209-10. The court further notes that prevailing party should be read consistently
throughout all sections of the EAJA and discounts the argument that the EAJA is not a statute
"authorizing" a fee award for a prevailing party merely because it mandates such an award. Id at
210.
100 Id at 210-11.
101 Id at 211.
102 49 Fed Cl 738 (2001).
103 Id at 747. Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Buckhannon, a contractor filed a bid
protest action against the government, seeking to prevent the Navy from converting an invita-
tion for bids to a request for proposals and to have the contract awarded to itself Brickwood
Contractors; Inc v United States, 49 Fed C 148, 150 (2001). As a result of the suit, the Navy can-
celled the solicitation and offered a new one, instead of pursuing the conversion. Id.The case was
then dismissed as moot and the contractor sought attorney's fees. Id at 150-51. Relying on the
catalyst theory, the court awarded the contractor attorney's fees as the prevailing party, even
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cases under the EAJA, distinguished the EAJA from the statutes in
Buckhannon, and emphasized several policy issues." First, the court
observed that the holding in Buckhannon specifically applies to the
ADA and the FHA.' Chief Justice Rehnquist indicates this limitation
in the last sentence of the opinion, which states, "we hold that the
'catalyst theory' is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney's
fees under the FHAA and ADA.'' In addition, the court observed
that the EAJA was not mentioned in the Buckhannon opinion." Fur-
thermore, the court pointed out that the note that the prevailing-party
provisions in other fee-shifting statutes have been interpreted consis-
tently and the three statutes listed as examples.. were dicta.'  More-
over, it maintained that the decision can be distinguished factually on
the basis that the lawsuit filed by the Buckhannon plaintiffs did not
cause a change in the defendant's behavior: the legislature, not a party
to the lawsuit, independently acted to cause the case to become
moot.' °
Most importantly, the court found that the plain language of the
statutes directly at issue in Buckhannon and those specifically listed in
that case contrasts with that of the EAJA, so Buckhannon's definition
is not appropriate."' The fee-shifting provisions of the statutes at issue
in Buckhannon (the ADA and the FHAA) afford broad discretion to
the trial court in determining whether to award a prevailing party
attorney's fees and contain no requirement for review of the underly-
ing merits of the case.' 2 The Buckhannon Court also named three fed-
eral fee-shifting statutes which have been consistently interpreted
though there had been no final judgment on the merits, because the plaintiff had "significantly
contributed to producing a 'voluntary action by the defendant that affords the plaintiff all or
some of the relief [it] sought through a judgment."' Id at 156, quoting Hewitt v Helms, 482 US
755, 760 (1987). After the Buckhannon decision, the defendant filed a motion for relief from
judgment, arguing that the newly issued decision invalidated the catalyst theory as a means of
achieving prevailing-party status under federal attorney's fee statutes. Brickwood, 49 Fed C at
740-41.
104 Id at 743-49.
105 Id at 744.
106 Id at 743, citing Buckhannon, 532 US at 610 (internal citations omitted).
107 Brickwood, 49 Fed Cl at 744.
108 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat 259; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 89 Stat
402; Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,90 Stat 2641.
109 Brickwood, 49 Fed Cl at 744.
110 Id. See note 38. In fact, the legislature's action allowed the defendants to change their
behavior without violating the law. Brickwood, 49 Fed Cl at 744.
111 Brickwood, 49 Fed Cl at 745-47.
112 Id at 745. See ADA, 104 Stat 327, 371 ("In any action or administrative proceeding
commenced pursuant to this Act, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and
costs."); FHAA, 102 Stat 1619, 1633 ("In ... any civil action .. . ,the court.... in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and
costs.").
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with the ADA and FHAA, and the EAJA was not among these.'13 The
court explained that these three statutes contain language similar to
the ADA and FHAA, providing the same broad discretion and lack-
ing any requirement for a meritorious review.'"4 The EAJA, on the
other hand, mandates that an award of attorney's fees be made to a
"prevailing party ... unless the court finds the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make
an award unjust.""" An analysis of both law and fact is required by the
court in order to make a "substantially justified" determination."6 The
court emphasized that while all of these statutes contain a prevailing
party requirement, the EAJA differs from the Buckhannon statutes
because it creates a statutory presumption that the prevailing party
shall be granted attorney's fees and requires the court to make two
specific findings.'"
According to the court, the distinctions between the EAJA and
the Buckhannon statutes render the Supreme Court's concerns about
the risks associated with endorsing the catalyst theory inapplicable."'
The EAJA's "substantially justified" requirement "provides a safe-
guard to ensure that a plaintiff's victory had the necessary legal merit
to support an award of attorney's fees." 9 Therefore, the court rea-
soned, a plaintiff could not be awarded attorney's fees merely on the
basis of a nonfrivolous complaint that possesses sufficient merit to
withstand a motion to dismiss-the merits of the case must be consid-
ered."O
Considering the "substantially justified" requirement, the court in
Brickwood found that "prevailing party" under the EAJA carries a
different meaning than "prevailing party" under the fee-shifting provi-
sions in Buckhannon."'2 The EAJA's prevailing-party requirement
113 Brickwood, 49 Fed CI at 745.
114 Id.
115 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
116 Brickwood, 49 Fed CI at 746.
117 Id. The court noted that while it had previously employed cases examining other fee-
shifting statutes in interpreting the EAJA's prevailing party provision, the prevailing construc-
tion of such provisions "was consistent with the plain language and legislative history" of the
EAJA. Id at 745-46 n 5. Because Buckhannon's newly established standards conflict with the
language and history of the EAJA, the distinctions between the EAJA and other fee-shifting
statutes are now important. Id.
118 Id at 746-47.
119 Id at 747.
120 Id at 746. Certain tradeoffs of including or excluding the catalyst theory, according to
Scalia's concurrence in Buckhannon, are rewarding phony claims and denying valid ones respec-
tively. Brickwood, 49 Fed CI at 747 n 6, citing Buckhannon, 532 US at 618 (Scalia concurring).
The Brickwood court explains that under the EAJA, the "substantially justified" requirement
reduces this risk of inclusion so that there is little chance of rewarding phony claims; but the risk
of exclusion remains. 49 Fed CI at 747 n 6.
121 Brickwood, 49 Fed CI at 744.
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alone cannot establish the merits of a case, because the "substantially
justified" requirement directs a special inquiry into the merits.'" For
that reason, the court stated that the prevailing-party requirement re-
volves around "whether the plaintiff's lawsuit actually caused the
agency to provide the relief the plaintiff requested.
''3
Finally, the Brickwood court echoed the dissent in Buckhannon
by stating that "to interpret Buckhannon as requiring formal written
judgments on the merits or formal findings of unlawful conduct will
inhibit settlements and discourage parties from taking self-corrective
action."'2 The formal judgment requirement also could result in ex-
tended litigation and written opinions in every action, even when a
case's merits are obvious."' The court felt that such a view would
thwart the purpose of the EAJA: to provide small businesses and indi-
viduals with access to the courts "for review of or to defend against
unreasonable government action without inhibition."2
III. BUCKHANNON'S DEFINITION OF PREVAILING PARTY SHOULD
NOT APPLY TO THE EAJA
Buckhannon's definition of prevailing party should not apply to
the EAJA, and therefore, the catalyst theory should remain viable as a
basis for recovery under the EAJA. Several reasons compel this con-
clusion. First, Buckhannon's holding does not mandate its application
to all fee-shifting statutes that authorize an award to prevailing par-
ties. Second, the EAJA is distinguishable based on its language, ex-
press private attorneys general rationale, and the presence of the gov-
ernment as a party. Third, legislative purpose indicates that Buckhan-
non's definition of prevailing party is inconsistent with the EAJA.
Fourth, legislative history specifically endorses the catalyst theory as
an acceptable means of recovery under the EAJA. Finally, the policy
implications of Buckhannon's definition advise against applying that
interpretation to the EAJA.
A. The Limited Holding in Buckhannon
Buckhannon does not demand that the catalyst theory be re-
jected under the EAJA. Buckhannon specifically limits its holding to
122 Id at 747.
123 Id. The court goes on to say that even if Buckhannon standards were applied to this case,
the plaintiff would still be a prevailing party. Id. The court's remarks at the hearing "amounted to
a finding that the Navy had acted unlawfully" and "represent the necessary 'judicial imprimatur'
that caused the change in the legal relationship of the parties." Id at 749.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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the ADA and the FHAA.'2 While other fee-shifting statutes are dis-
cussed elsewhere in the opinion and the Court notes that it has inter-
preted fee-shifting provisions consistently,'2 their mention is dicta."9
The opinion explicitly states that its holding applies to the ADA and
the FHAA. '3 Furthermore, despite the list of statutes referenced in
the opinion, the EAJA is not mentioned at all in Buckhannon, not
even among those statutes named by the majority as being consistent
with the ADA and the FHAA."
B. The EAJA is Distinguishable
1. "Substantially justified" requirement.
The textual differences between the EAJA and ADA/FHAA
suggest that Buckhannon's rationale is not applicable to the EAJA.
13
As discussed in Brickwood, the "substantially justified" prong of the
EAJA's statutory definition alleviates the concerns associated with a
broad definition that allows the catalyst theory.'3 It ensures that a
party has prevailed on the merits and creates a higher bar for recovery
in a way that other fee-shifting statutes do not. In addition, Congress
has left a "safety valve" by providing that the court not award fees
127 See Buckhannon, 532 US at 610 ("[W]e hold that the 'catalyst theory' is not a permissi-
ble basis for the award of attorney's fees under the FHAA and ADA") (internal citations omit-
ted); Brickwood, 49 Fed Cl at 744 (discussing the limited holding in Buckhannon).
128 Some courts have relied on this fact in construing Buckhannon's holding broadly. See
Sileikis, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 12737 at *8-9; Former Employees of Motorola, 176 F Supp 2d at
1373; Thayer, 15 Vet App at 211 (2001).
129 See Buckhannon, 532 US at 602-03 & n 4; Brickwood, 49 Fed C1 at 744 (deeming the
mention of other fee-shifting statutes in Buckhannon dicta).
130 This is not to say that reading fee-shifting statutes with similar language consistently
does not make sense-certainly it does. However, the Supreme Court could not have meant that
all fee-shifting statutes, even those that are substantially different, must be interpreted consis-
tently. As discussed in Part III.B, the EAJA is markedly different from the statutes in Buckhan-
non. While it heretofore may not have been necessary to differentiate the EAJA, these dissimi-
larities warrant a different interpretation of prevailing party than the one adopted in Buckhan-
non for the ADA and the FHAA.
131 See Buckhannon, 532 US at 602-03 & n 4; Brickwood, 49 Fed Cl at 744 (recognizing that
the EAJA is not mentioned in Buckhannon).
132 Compare ADA, 42 USC § 12205 ("In any action or administrative proceeding com-
menced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and
costs."); FHAA, 42 USC § 3613(c)(2) ("In a civil action under subsection (a) of this section, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs."), with EAJA, 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(A) ("[A] court shall award to a pre-
vailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... unless the court finds that
the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make
an award unjust.'). For a thorough discussion of these differences and the resulting implications,
see notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
133 See Brickwood, 49 Fed Cl at 747 (discussing the effects of the "substantially justified"
requirement); see also text accompanying notes 119-20.
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when special circumstances make an award unjust.' Hence, the
EAJA's standard for a prevailing party's recovery is substantially dif-
ferent than the ADA and FHAA standard that a court "in its discre-
tion" may award fees.' 3' Because of this difference, Buckhannon's rule
does not apply to the EAJA, and a broader definition of prevailing
party is appropriate.
2. Private attorneys general rationale.
Other differences between the EAJA and the ADA/FI-AA make
application of Buckhannon's rule inappropriate. First, the EAJA is a
more general statute than the ADA and the FHAA, both of which
address specific types of discrimination.'3 More significantly, the
EAJA specifically emphasizes private enforcement as its rationale for
fee shifting. 37 The EAJA was a reaction to the Supreme Court's limita-
tion of fee shifting in Alyeska.' - Congress passed the EAJA to pre-
serve and promote private enforcement, and the unprecedented stat-
ute was designed to expand fee-shifting authority greatly.'3 As a result,
the EAJA increases government liability for attorney's fees."' These
aspects of the EAJA separate it from the ADA and FHDA. A broader
definition of prevailing party than Buckhannon's conception is more
consistent with the expansion of liability for attorney's fees that Con-
gress sought to achieve under the EAJA.
3. Government as a party.
The greatest difference between the EAJA and the ADA/FHAA,
and also the most compelling reason for adopting a broader definition,
is that the EAJA involves suits brought by or against the government.
134 HR Rep No 96-1418 at 11 (cited in note 28).
135 42 USC § 12205; 42 USC § 3613(c)(2).
136 On the EAJA, see HR Rep No 96-1418 at 9 (cited in note 28) ("[The EAJA] estab-
lish[es] a general statutory exception for an award of fees against the Government."). The EAJA
applies in a multitude of litigation contexts, see 28 USC § 2412(d)(1)(A) (providing for an award
of attorney's fees "in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) ... brought by or against
the United States"), while the ADA and FHAA are situation-specific. See ADA, 42 USC § 12205
(providing for an award of attorney's fees in cases involving discrimination against qualified in-
dividuals with disabilities); FHAA, 42 USC § 3613(c)(2) (providing for an award of attorney's
fees in cases involving discriminatory housing practices).
137 See EAJA § 202(a), 94 Stat at 2325 ("Congress finds that certain individuals, partner-
ships, corporations, and labor and other organizations may be deterred from seeking review ot
or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in se-
curing the vindication of their rights in civil actions and in administrative proceedings.").
138 According to Congress, the Supreme Court in Alyeska had "limited the inherent powers
of courts to award fees when the prevailing party acted as a private attorney general." HR Rep
No 96-1418 at 6 (cited in note 28).
139 See text accompanying notes 12-20.
140 HR Rep No 96-1418 at 6-7 (cited in note 28).
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The fact that the government is necessarily the party against whom a
citizen is litigating differentiates the EAJA so that a broader defini-
tion of prevailing party than Buckhannon's is justified. ' Furthermore,
because of the government's role, the implications of the Buckhannon
rule are more severe than when a private party is involved. The fed-
eral government was not a party in Buckhannon, so the following con-
cerns were not present:
a) Disincentive to litigate against the government. There is a
greater disincentive to litigate against the government than a private
party, so more encouragement of citizen suits is needed. A disparity
exists because of government's greater resources and expertise."' Liti-
gation against the government is intimidating and its size and power
discourage suits against it.'' Congress tried to level the playing field
with the EAJA." Considering that Congress attempted to counteract
this increased deterrence through the EAJA, catalysts should be able
to recover attorney's fees from the government as prevailing parties
under the EAJA.
141 See EAJA § 202(b), 94 Stat at 2325 ("The Congress further finds that because of the
greater resources and expertise of the United States the standard for an award of fees against
the United States should be different from the standard governing an award against a private
litigant, in certain situations."). The ADA and FHAA do not limit their applicability to suits in-
volving the government. See ADA, 42 USC §§ 12112(a), 12132,12182(a) (prohibiting discrimina-
tion by various entities, including employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, joint la-
bor-management committees, public entities, and persons who own, lease (or lease to), or oper-
ate a place of public accommodation); FHAA, 42 USC § 3613 (a)(1)(A) ("An aggrieved person
may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States district court or State court not
later than 2 years after the occurrence ... to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such dis-
criminatory housing practice or breach.").
142 See EAJA § 202(b), 94 Stat at 2325 (noting the greater resources and expertise of the
United States); HR Rep No 96-1418 at 5-6 (cited in note 28) ("The economic deterrents to con-
testing governmental action are magnified in these cases by the disparity between the resources
and expertise of these individuals and their government. The purpose of the bill is to reduce the
deterrents and disparity."). See also Harold I Krent, Fee-Shifting Under the EqualAccess to Jus-
tice Act-A Qualified Success, 11 Yale L & Pol Rev 458, 463 (1993) (discussing the lack of parity
between the government and private noninstitutional litigants, noting in particular that the gov-
ernment "can marshal more resources" and that "the government's sheer size may give it an un-
fair advantage in litigation").
143 See id at 463 n 24 ("[S]ome private parties plainly cannot afford to litigate in the same
style as the government, and they may not pursue litigation against the government vigorously
because of their lack of resources.").
144 See HR Rep No 96-1418 at 5--6, 9 (cited in note 28) (discussing the purpose of the
EAJA); Haywood, Comment, 61 U Chi L Rev at 990 (cited in note 10) ("The EAJA's stated pur-
pose was to level the playing field for private citizens and businesses, especially those of lesser
means, in litigation with the government."). The EAJA leveled the playing field by (1) "en-
sur[ing] that the United States will be subject to the common law and statutory exceptions to the
American Rule regarding attorney fees" and (2) "entitling certain prevailing parties to recover
an award of attorney fees, expert witness fees and other expenses against the United States,
unless the Government action was substantially justified" HR Rep No 96-1418 at 6 (cited in
note 28).
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If Buckhannon's definition is applied to the EAJA, the disincen-
tive to sue the government may be increased because the government
could moot cases by voluntarily changing its behavior. The govern-
ment may be in a better position to change its harmful behavior if it
chooses to do so."5 Moreover, it has a duty to the people and may be
more likely to change its conduct when a problem is brought to its at-
tention. Suits against the government may be mooted more than with
private parties; if unable to recover in this situation, citizens are even
less likely than normal to assert themselves in the first place. Further-
more, when the merits of a case are strong, the government is even
more likely to change its behavior. As a result, citizens will be most
discouraged from bringing suits when they are needed the most.
b) Check on government. Citizens who vindicate their rights in
litigation with the government act as an important check on the gov-
ernment. The impact of unreasonable government action is profound;
without the ability of citizens to contest such action, the government
can coerce compliance.6 Improper behavior by the government must
be deterred, and citizen suits are invaluable in this respect.' 7 They
function to assure that government actions are working fairly and ef-
fectively as well as to hone the system.'4' In a suit with the government,
a citizen not only protects his own interest but refines public policy."'
With so much at stake when the government is involved, it is ex-
tremely important to encourage citizen suits.'O Considering the rapid
growth of agencies and regulation, an increased need for checks and
145 The government is in a better position because it has greater resources with which to af-
fect change and because its economic cost of change is mitigated by the fact that it is not a profit-
maximizing entity. Although the government's bureaucracy tends to slow its action, this is less of
a concern, since the litigation process itself is slow. In addition, many of these cases involve agen-
cies, which may be able to react more quickly than the government as a whole.
146 See HR Rep No 96-1418 at 10 (cited in note 28) ("[Ihe ability of most citizens to con-
test any unreasonable exercise of authority has decreased. Thus ... the Government with its
greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce compliance with its position.").
147 See id at 9-10 (discussing the fact that citizens are deterred from litigating against the
government, the negative effects this produces, and the benefits that arise when an individual
vindicates his rights against the government).
148 See id at 10 (explaining that litigation can uncover error in the underpinnings of a rule
and "may provide a vehicle for developing or announcing more precise rules").
149 See id (A litigant "against the Government is not only representing his or her own
vested interest but is also refining and formulating public policy. An adjudication or civil action
provides a concrete, adversarial test of Government regulation and thereby insures the legiti-
macy and fairness of the law.").
150 Usually, the appropriate remedy for a citizen wanting to effect change is through the leg-
islature, but Congress has made exceptions to sovereign immunity to allow citizens to address
certain issues through resort to the judicial process. By subjecting the government to liability for
attorney's fees in certain circumstances, the EAJA creates an exception to sovereign immunity
so as to encourage socially beneficial litigation. Sovereign immunity remains an integral part of
our legal system in many other contexts.
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balances exists."' Therefore, a broad definition of prevailing party
should be maintained.
Once again, the effects of applying Buckhannon's definition are
more severe because the government is involved. If catalysts do not
recover, then citizens are deterred from contesting unreasonable gov-
ernment actions. With the decreased threat of citizen suits, the gov-
ernment may have less of an incentive to refrain from unreasonable
exercises of authority or excessive regulation. This incentive may be
lessened further by the reduced cost to the government of any citizen
suit that is brought: even if challenged, the government may change its
behavior without having to pay attorney's fees. Thus, rejection of the'
catalyst theory creates a situation in which there is a greater danger of
abuse by the government.
c) Compensation for citizens who promote the public welfare. Fi-
nally, from a fairness standpoint, citizens should be able to recover
from the government as catalysts. The government should not be able
to exploit citizens; it is only just to compensate a party that compels
the government to take favorable action. Congress recognized the un-
fairness of expecting a citizen to bear this cost when he is serving a
public purpose." The House Report on the EAJA states, "the expense
of correcting error on the part of the Government should not rest
wholly on the party whose willingness to litigate ar [sic] adjudicate has
helped to define the limits of Federal authority."13 For this additional
reason, the catalyst theory should be included under the EAJA and
Buckhannon should not be applied.
C. Legislative Purpose
A narrow reading of prevailing party frustrates the purpose of
the EAJA. Congress enacted the EAJA because it feared that the
costs of securing vindication of rights combined with an inability to
recover attorney's fees precluded resort to the adjudicatory process
for many citizens.'4 As Congress stated, "[litigants] may be deterred
from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable govern-
mental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindica-
tion of their rights in civil actions.""' Congress was compelled to ex-
pand the liability of the United States in order to encourage parties to
contest injustice. Therefore, it chose a broad standard for recovery,16
151 HR Rep No 96-1418 at 9-10 (cited in note 28).
152 See id at 10.
153 Id. Note that the House Report said "the party whose willingness to litigate ... [or] ad-
judicate" and not "the party whose litigation or adjudication." Id (emphasis added).
154 Id at 5-6 (discussing the "economic deterrents of contesting governmental action").
155 EAJA § 202(a), Pub L No 96-481,94 Stat 2325 (1980).
156 HR Rep No 96-1418 at 6-7 (cited in note 28).
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one that would "be different from the standard governing an award
against a private litigant." 7
Rejection of the catalyst theory is inconsistent with these objec-
tives. It perpetuates the problems the EAJA was designed to amelio-
rate, because it deters citizens from vindicating their rights. Disallow-
ing recovery under the catalyst theory makes it more difficult for par-
ties to qualify as prevailing; as a consequence, there is less incentive
for parties to vindicate their rights. As Justice Ginsburg states, Buck-
hannon's definition "impede[s] access to court for the less well-heeled,
and shrink[s] the incentive Congress created for the enforcement of
federal law by private attorneys general.'' 8 This is precisely the result
Congress was trying to avoid. Adoption of Buckhannon's definition of
"prevailing party" would frustrate the broad standard Congress en-
acted. The catalyst theory, on the other hand, furthers the EAJA's goal
of serving the public interest and ensuring equal access to the gov-
ernment. Considering the civil rights objectives Congress had in mind
when it enacted the EAJA, it is better to err on the side of qualifying
too many parties as "prevailing" rather than excluding some who
should qualify.
The question of whether to approve the catalyst theory is a mat-
ter of degree: how far must the courts go to prevent deterrence? When
enacting the EAJA, Congress was so concerned with deterrence that it
placed the burden of proof on the government to prove its position
was "substantially justified.".. This indicates Congress's commitment
to reducing deterrence and suggests that a broad interpretation of
prevailing party, which would further encourage citizens to vindicate
their rights, is congruent with the EAJA.
D. Legislative History
Legislative history reveals that Congress intended the catalyst
theory to be a means of achieving prevailing-party status under the
EAJA. Congress dictated that interpretation of the term "prevailing
party" should be "consistent with the law that has developed under
existing statutes." At the time of this enactment, the catalyst theory
was viewed as an accepted form of recovery. 6 Moreover, Congress
157 EAJA § 202(b), Pub L No 96-481,94 Stat 2325.
158 Buckhannon, 532 US at 623 (Ginsburg dissenting).
159 See HR Rep No 96-1418 at 10 (cited in note 28) ("[T]he strong deterrents to contesting
government action require that the burden of proof rest with the Government.").
160 Id at 11.
161 See, for example, Nadeau v Helgemoe, 581 F2d 275, 279 (1st Cir 1978) ("It is often ex-
plained that when plaintiffs lawsuit acts as a 'catalyst' in prompting defendants to take action to
meet plaintiffs claims, attorney's fees are justified despite the lack of judicial involvement in the
result."); Ross v Horn, 598 F2d 1312, 1322 (3d Cir 1979) (looking to the substance of the litiga-
tion's outcome).
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specifically stated that "'prevailing party' should not be limited to a
victor only after entry of a final judgment following a full trial on the
merits.""' The legislature declared that "[a] party may be deemed pre-
vailing if he obtains a favorable settlement of his case,"'6 citing Foster
v Boorstin.'. The court in Foster held that the effectiveness of the fee-
shifting provision would be greatly reduced if the government could
avoid liability for fees simply by awarding the requested relief after a
court action had been filed but before a judgment or court order.'6
Considering its endorsement of this case and other clarifying remarks,
Congress clearly intended to include catalysts as prevailing parties.'
While other fee-shifting statutes may be ambiguous on this issue, as
the Supreme Court has found, Congress's explicit direction disquali-
fies any conflicting notion of prevailing party under the EAJA.'67
One last detail of the House Report is notable, in part because
courts have relied upon consistency of interpretation among fee-
shifting statutes in applying Buckhannon to the EAJA. While inter-
pretation of prevailing party under the EAJA was directed to be con-
sistent with the law that had developed under other statutes, that con-
sistency was to be with law that had developed, not law that would de-
velop. Congress specifically mentioned the law to which it was refer-
ring. Though that law might have changed now, the law that Con-
gress approved remains that which was in existence at the time Con-
gress wrote the statute.'69
162 HR Rep No 96-1418 at 11 (cited in note 28).
163 Id.
164 561 F2d 340 (DC Cir 1977), cited in HR Rep No 96-1418 at 11 (cited in note 28).
165 See Foster, 561 F2d at 342-43. Foster awarded attorney's fees to a catalyst who had re-
ceived the relief he sought after the filing of and as a result of a lawsuit. Id at 341. No judicial re-
lief was granted, aside from the receipt of the complaint and a stay of the proceedings by consent
of the parties. Id at 341-42.The Foster court felt the catalyst theory was consistent with the incen-
tive Congress was trying to create for persons of limited means. Id at 342-43.
166 See HR Rep No 96-1418 at 11 (cited in note 28) (discussing prevailing party); see also
Photo Data, Inc v Sawyer, 533 F Supp 348,351 (D DC 1982) (relying on the legislative history of
the EAJA in awarding attorney's fees to a party who obtained a favorable settlement of his
case).
167 The Buckhannon majority found the legislative history in that case "at best ambiguous."
532 US at 607-08. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text. The legislative history of the EAJA is
not ambiguous. While some of the language is similar to the language in the legislative history
materials in Buckhannon, the case referenced in the House Report to the EAJA clearly em-
braces the catalyst theory and involves no enforceable judgment, unlike the case referenced in
the legislative materials in Buckhannon. See note 48.
163 See HR Rep No 96-1418 at 11 (cited in note 28) (citing, among others, Foster, 561 F2d
340; Bradley v School Broad of the City of Richmond, 416 US 696 (1974); Corcoran v Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc, 121 F2d 575 (9th Cir 1941)).
169 Even if the interpretation of prevailing party were to have been consistent with the law
that would develop under existing statutes instead of the law that had developed, Buckhannon
would not apply, because the ADA and FHAA were not "existing statutes" at the time the
EAJA was enacted. The statutes in Buckhannon were not enacted until 1990 and 1988 respec-
tively, so they do not fall within the body of law which Congress specified should be consistent
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E. Consequences of Buckhannon's Definition
Finally, there are four policy and incentive reasons why Buckhan-
non's definition should not apply to the EAJA. Two already have been
mentioned, namely that a definition of prevailing party excluding the
catalyst theory would deter "meritorious but expensive suits"'' and
would create an incentive for defendants to moot cases before judg-
ment to avoid attorney's fees.7' Third, Buckhannon's rule likely would
discourage informal settlement and increase litigation, which is ineffi-
cient.'n Instead of settling a case out of court with its opponent, a party
may be compelled to continue with litigation-consuming judicial re-
sources and increasing costs-in order to recover attorney's fees.
Fourth, rejection of the catalyst theory creates a disincentive for at-
torneys who would pursue public interest cases." Fee shifting has
been used to encourage and allow attorneys to undertake complex
civil rights and environmental cases when plaintiffs otherwise would
be unable to afford to pay them.' 7 Under the Buckhannon rule, attor-
neys may be deterred by the possibility of not recovering fees even
when the plaintiff receives the requested relief. This problem is com-
pounded by the increased incentive that defendants have to moot a
case unilaterally at the last minute in order to avoid attorney's fees."5
Several potential policy concerns about applying the catalyst the-
ory under the EAJA warrant discussion. First, a broader definition of
prevailing party would increase litigation, since the ability to recover
as catalysts removes deterrents to litigation. Whatever hesitation is as-
sociated with encouraging more suits, increased litigation is justified in
this situation by the important societal value of these suits. Similarly,
secondary litigation could arise if courts must determine whether a
party has been a catalyst. 6 While courts undoubtedly will have to de-
with the EAJA.
170 Buckhannon, 532 US at 608.
171 See Part III.B.3.a and text accompanying note 50.
172 See Thomas Scarlett, Supreme Court Limits Reimbursement of Attorney Fees under Fed-
eral Statutes, Trial 16 (Aug 2001) (noting the irony of a decision which may "force some claimants
into litigation rather than allow an informal settlement").
173 See Marcia Coyle, Fee Change is a Sea-Change; But Some Seek Way to Skirt Justices'
Limit on Catalyst Theory Fees, Natl L J Al (Jun 11, 2001) (commenting that the fee-shifting pro-
visions were tools employed by Congress to inspire attorneys to handle complex environmental
and civil rights cases and discussing the negative impact Buckhannon will have on litigation un-
der the fee-shifting statutes).
174 See id.
175 See Baumgartner v Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F3d 541, 548 (3d Cir 1994) ("[I]f
defendants could deprive plaintiffs of attorney's fees by unilaterally mooting the underlying case
by conceding to plaintiffs' demands, attorneys might be more hesitant about bringing these civil
rights suits.").
176 Chief Justice Rehaquist raises this concern in Buckhannon, 532 US at 609-10. See also
note 52 and accompanying text.
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cide whether a party qualifies as a catalyst if it is to recover under that
theory as a prevailing party, it may be worth the cost in order to stimu-
late private enforcement of public policy and enable those with
"meritorious but expensive" suits to have access to the courts. 7 These
are the laudable goals of the EAJA. Nonetheless, the catalyst
determination is no different than the numerous other determinations
that a court makes on a regular basis.73 Specific guidelines are in place
for making such a determination and have been used by the courts of
appeals for years. Perhaps most importantly, this extra litigation must
be balanced with the corresponding decrease in litigation that results
from allowing the catalyst theory. If catalysts can recover, parties are
not forced to keep litigating in order to receive the mandated judicial
stamp of approval, as they would under the rule in Buckhannon. Liti-
gation may be discontinued earlier, when the government grants relief,
and judicial resources saved."
Another concern associated with adopting the catalyst theory is
the disincentive that may be created for a defendant to change its
conduct voluntarily.lu This concern is lessened under the EAJA be-
cause the defendant is not a private party. The government is less
likely to be disincentivized since it has no profit-maximizing motive; it
also has great financial resources. In addition, even though the gov-
ernment may be liable for fees if it changes its conduct, it still may de-
cide that changing its conduct earlier offsets the cost of continued liti-
gation, potential damages, and the potential cost of even higher attor-
ney's fees later. Allowing catalysts to recover also may create an in-
centive for the government ex ante to ensure that its behavior is be-
yond reproach, because changing its conduct after litigation has begun
would be costly.'
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the language and structure of the relevant cases
and statutes, principles of legal interpretation, Congress's purpose and
intent, and various policy and incentive concerns reveals that Buck-
hannon's interpretation of prevailing party does not and should not
apply to the EAJA. The Buckhannon opinion is limited to the ADA
and the FHAA, and furthermore, the EAJA is distinct from those
177 Buckhannon, 532 US at 608.
178 Baumgartner, 21 F3d at 548 (describing the question in a catalyst case as one "of degree
and one which the district courts, in their factfinding expertise, deal with on a regular basis").
179 Buckhannon, 532 US at 639-40 (Ginsburg dissenting) (arguing that the catalyst rule pre-
serves judicial resources).
180 Id at 608. See also text accompanying note 51.
181 Buckhannon, 532 US at 639 (Ginsburg dissenting) (discussing the incentives that the
catalyst theory has on compliance with the law).
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statutes such that Buckhannon does not apply. The EAJA's "substan-
tially justified" requirement, recognized private attorneys general ra-
tionale, and its requirement that the government be a party distinguish
the statute. In addition, Buckhannon should not be applied because its
rule is inconsistent with the EAJA's purpose and because legislative
history shows that Congress intended the catalyst theory to be a
means of achieving prevailing-party status. Extension of Buckhannon
to the EAJA would enfeeble a statute which was expressly designed
to expand statutory fee shifting in the hopes of stimulating private en-
forcement. Policy and incentive implications of a narrow definition of
prevailing party also cut against extending Buckhannon to the EAJA.
Therefore, even in the wake of Buckhannon, the catalyst theory
should remain viable under the EAJA.
